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ARBITRATION-HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND CURRENT TENSIONS

Two Contexts: Union-Managementand Individual Employee

There has been a substantial increase in the use of arbitration
to resolve employment law disputes that only a decade ago would
have been litigated in court. Some members of the legal community have welcomed this development 1 and others have cursed it.2
Regardless, an employment law attorney must be prepared to effectively represent clients in the arbitration arena.
There are two types of arbitrated employment disputes: (1)
disputes that arise out of a union-management collective bargaining agreement providing for the arbitration of such disputes (normally called "grievance" arbitration); and (2) disputes that arise
when the employee is not covered by a union-management collective agreement but rather a different agreement containing an arbitration clause.
The arbitration of union-management disputes has a long history in the United States, yet the arbitration of non-union-man1. See generally Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19
Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res. 369 (2004); Kimberlee K. Kovach, Musings on Idea(l)s in the Ethical
Regulation of Mediators:Honesty, Enforcement, and Education, 21 Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res.
123 (2005); Leona Green, MandatoryArbitrationof StatutoryEmployment Disputes:A Public Policy Issue in Need of a Legislative Solution, 12 Notre Dame J.L., Ethics & Pub. Policy
173 (1998).
2. See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1017 (1996)
(discussing the employer take-it-or-leave-it approach to forcing arbitration on employees);
Richard A. Bales, The Laissez-FaireArbitrationMarket and the Need for a Uniform Federal
StandardGoverning Employment and ConsumerArbitration,52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 583 (2004)
(showing that contract provisions evidence an overreaching by business and employers in
drafting arbitration provisions); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players,Adhesive Contracts,
and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment ArbitrationAwards, 29 McGeorge L. Rev. 223 (1998); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the
Debate over PredisputeEmployment ArbitrationAgreements, 16 Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res. 559
(2001); Lucy T. France & Timothy C. Kelly, Mandatory Arbitrationof Civil Rights Claims
in the Workplace: No Enforceability without Equivalency, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 449 (2003).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol68/iss2/9

2

Corbett: Arbitrating Employment Law Disputes

2007

ARBITRATING EMPLOYMENT LAW DISPUTES

417

agement disputes is of recent origin. The latter context is most
controversial and, consequently, where this Article directs its attention. The Article will also draw upon the development of labormanagement arbitration because it, unlike the recent development of non-labor-management employment contract arbitration,
is universally accepted by the disputing parties and the courts.
Thus, labor-management arbitration provides a convenient backdrop for the discussion of practices and procedures in the nonunion-management context.
This Article is for the attorney who (1) considers using arbitration as the dispute resolution method in employment agreements; (2) drafts or reviews such agreements; (3) defends or challenges arbitration provisions in court; (4) contests or defends arbitrators' awards in court; or (5) serves as an employment law
arbitrator.
As used herein, "arbitration" is a dispute resolution process in
which a neutral third party (arbitrator), generally chosen by the
disputing parties, renders a binding decision 3 after a hearing at
which the parties have an opportunity to be heard and present
evidence. 4 The general attraction of arbitration is that the parties
may resolve their disputes using decision-makers of their choosing,5 based on principles of their choosing (often widely accepted
6
industry principles), and pursuant to a process of their choosing.

3. Harrison v. Nissan Motors Corp., 111 F.3d 343, 349-50 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that
completion of non-binding arbitration as a precondition to filing a lawsuit does not constitute "arbitration" under the Federal Arbitration Act, because it is non-binding and its use
is only required as a mandated form of potential settlement, not resolution of the dispute).
4. Cheng-Canindinv. Renaissance Hotel Assocs., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 872 (Cal. App.
1st Dist. 1996) (adopting a definition of "arbitration" from Black's Law Dictionary; what is
not included in this definition is what is often called "non-binding" arbitration, where the
decision-maker makes a non-binding decision which the disputants may consider as a settlement option during further settlement negotiations); Ditto v. RE/MAX PreferredProps.,
Inc., 861 P.2d 1000, 1001 n. 1 (Okla. App. 1993) (citing McDonnell DouglasFin. Corp. v. Pa.
Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir. 1988)) (explaining that, "[a]lthough the
clause refers to 'mediation,' the process is clearly binding on both parties, and is therefore
indistinguishable from, and may be treated as, an agreement to arbitrate disputes").
5. Ditto, 861 P.2d at 1004 (holding the arbitration agreement unenforceable because
all the arbitrators were chosen by one party).
6. Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: JudicialReview of
ArbitrationAwards, 45 Buff. L. Rev. 49, 51 (1997) (discussing the benefits of arbitration).
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The Historical Context of Arbitration

Traditionally, parties used arbitration to resolve commercial,
business, and union-management contract disputes.7 Arbitration
arose in two scenarios: when the disputing parties agreed to submit an "existing" or "current" dispute to arbitration, or when their
pre-dispute business agreement included an arbitration clause requiring the arbitration of any "future" dispute.
Although courts historically enforced arbitration agreements
calling for the arbitration of existing or current disputes, they approached agreements requiring the arbitration of "future" disputes with hostility and refused enforcement.8 In 1925, Congress
enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which required judicial enforcement of both contemporaneous agreements mandating
the arbitration of "existing" or "current" disputes and "pre-dispute" arbitration agreements. Because Congress enacted the FAA
under its constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce, the Act applies only to "maritime transaction [s]" and contracts "evidencing a transaction involving commerce." s
Outside of maritime and interstate transactions, judicial hostility to mandatory arbitration continued after enactment of the
FAA. 10 Courts applying the FAA read the Commerce Clause nar7. In England, mercantile disputes have been decided by merchants since at least the
thirteenth century. During the Tudor period (1485-1603), the Privy Council, a major forum for commercial matters, solved its mercantile cases by reference to merchant arbitrators. In the American colonies, arbitration was an accepted form of dispute resolution. In
1753, Connecticut enacted a statute that created a formal legal framework for arbitration,
and, in 1768, the New York Chamber of Commerce was founded, one purpose of which was
the arbitration of disputes among its members. In 1920, New York enacted the first modem arbitration statute in the United States. Other states followed the New York lead, and,
in 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, which was followed by the drafting
of a Model Uniform Arbitration Act for the states. Montana adopted the Model Uniform
Arbitration Act in 1985. Bruce H. Mann, The Formalizationof Informal Law: Arbitration
before the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 443 (1984); Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 846 (1961). See also David S. Schwartz, Enforcing
Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 33; John R. Van Winkle, An Analysis of the Arbitration Rule of the Indiana Rules of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 27 Ind. L. Rev. 735
(1994) (discussing the history of arbitration in Indiana).
8. See Kulukundis Ship. Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-85 (2d Cir.
1942), Eighteenth century English court hostility to arbitration was adopted by many U.S.
courts in the nineteenth century. Judicial refusal to enforce arbitration agreements was so
accepted that even courts that recognized the precedent as unsound said that it could be
overturned only by legislative action. Id.
9. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1946).
10. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('Even
though the [FAA] had been on the books for almost 50 years in 1973, apparently neither
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rowly," and state and federal courts routinely invalidated arbitration agreements under state law unless the law required arbitration agreements be judicially enforced. 12 Indeed, as late as
1978, the Montana Supreme Court refused to enforce a pre-dis13
pute arbitration clause.
In 1955, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law adopted the Model Uniform Arbitration Act
(MUAA). 1 4 In turn, the MUAA adopted the FAA position regarding the enforceability of both current and pre-dispute arbitration
agreements.1 5 In 1985, the Montana State Legislature enacted a
variation of the MUAA 1 6 and, with certain exceptions, 17 author8
ized both current and pre-dispute arbitration.'
1.

The "Private"Law Tradition of Arbitration

Traditionally, arbitrators construed the parties' "private"
agreement and applied it to disputes of specialized facts pursuant
the [U.S. Supreme] Court nor the litigants even considered the possibility that the [FAA]
had pre-empted state-created rights."); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468,
477 (1989) ("The FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.").
11. Donna Meredith Matthews, Employment Law after Gilmer: Compulsory Arbitration
of Statutory Antidiscrimination Rights, 18 Berkeley J. Empl. & Lab. L. 347, 368 (1997)
("Logically, one could argue that the FAA reaches employment contracts only by way of the
Commerce Clause, and that when the FAA was enacted in 1925 commerce was still narrowly defined. Thus, this exclusion clause was intended to assuage concerns by the very
employees who might be affected-those engaged in interstate commerce. Because the
Commerce Clause did not reach other employment contracts, they were unaffected by the
FAA." (footnote omitted)).
12. Courts often used the Erie doctrine in deciding whether to apply state substantive
law in arbitration disputes. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Moses
H. Cone Meml. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (noting the FAA does not
create federal question jurisdiction).
13. Palmer Steel Structures v. Westech, Inc., 584 P.2d 152, 154-55 (Mont. 1978).
14. Am. Arb. Assoc., FairPlay: Perspectives from American ArbitrationAssociation on
Consumer and Employment Arbitration 9 (Am. Arb. Assoc. Jan. 2003) (available at http:/!
www.adr.org/si.asp?id=3652).
15. Unif. Arb. Act § 1, 7 U.L.A. 1956.
16. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 27-5-101 to -324 (2005).
17. Id. at § 27-5-114(2), which states pre-dispute arbitration clauses are valid and enforceable, except for
(a) claims arising out of personal injury, whether based on contract or tort;
(b) any contract by an individual for the acquisition of real or personal property,
services, or money or credit when the total consideration to be paid or furnished by
the individual is $5,000 or less;
(c) any agreement concerning or relating to insurance policies or annuity contracts
except for those contracts between insurance companies; or
(d) claims for workers' compensation.
18. Id. at § 27-5-114(1), (2).
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to the "rules of decision" 19 and procedure dictated by the parties.
Typically, the parties expected the "rules of decision" governing
their dispute would be "industry standards" rather than the common law or statutes. For example, to resolve a dispute between
merchants in the paper industry, parties would choose a decisionmaker knowledgeable of accepted paper industry standards. Similarly, a labor-management dispute in the paper industry would
be resolved pursuant to principles particular to labor-management relationships in that industry. Indeed, arbitrator selection
was generally based on knowledge of industry standards and the
accepted relationship standards of the parties (i.e., labor-management, architect-builder, buyer-seller, etc.) rather than legal training or experience.
Procedurally, arbitrations are simpler than what happens in
court. The arbitrator construes the parties' agreement regarding
facts of which the parties are equally aware pursuant to the rules
of decision. Thus, the parties do not require elaborate procedures
or evidentiary standards. Indeed, the parties chose arbitration, at
least in part, to escape court procedure and evidence standards
that impose unnecessary delays, and financial and human costs.
This is the context in which union-management arbitrators
usually operate today: the typical union-management dispute concerns the interpretation of the parties' private law, 20 and the arbitrator is a labor-management specialist who decides the dispute
under the particular collective agreement with due consideration
to accepted union-management principles.
2.

The Growth of "Public"Law in Arbitration

Particularly since the post-Depression era of the late 1930s
and 1940s, legislatures and courts have imposed greater legal
standards in the business, commercial, consumer and employment
arenas. In the labor-management arena, most of the law was
19. The term "rules of decision" is used here rather than the term "law," because it is
intended to address industry-based standards rather than judge- or legislature-made standards.
20. Throughout this Article, a distinction is made between the "private" law of contract
(the parties' intent) and "public" law (common law or statutory law intended to govern the
larger public, regardless of the wishes of any particular members of the public). Certainly,
public law may have a role in the construction of a contract, but the guiding principle is to
determine the "intent of the parties," and to the extent that legal rules of construction are
used to assist in determining "intent," "law" is used to determine the private law of the
parties.
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made from 1934 to the mid-1950s. 2 1 In the broader employment
arena, much development has occurred since the 1964 enactment
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 2 2 Contracting parties now face
innumerable legal standards, rights, and duties that greatly impact the parties' relationship, if not their own existence. Their
contractual relationship is governed as much by these legally imposed standards as their private intent. Consequently, contracts
expressly or implicitly incorporate legal standards apart from
what the parties might otherwise agree. With the development of
modern law, arbitrators frequently are called upon to apply judi23
cially- and legislatively-made "public" law in resolving disputes.
Of course, as always, the disputing parties dictate the rules of decision and the applicable procedure, but public law plays an everincreasing role. With this change, conflict between arbitrators
and courts regarding the interpretation and application of public
law was inevitable.
C.

Supreme Court Treatment of "Public"
Law Issues at Arbitration

In the 1953 case Wilko v. Swan,2 4 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that an arbitration clause invoked in connection with a Securities Act 2 5 claim was void regarding the resolution of a statutory claim. 2 6 Lower federal courts treated Wilko as creating a

21. The National Labor Relations Act (the Wagner Act) was enacted in 1935. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-69 (1940). The first major amendment occurred in 1947 with the enactment of the
Labor-Management Relations Act (the Taft-Hartly Act). 29 U.S.C. §§ 114-97 (1952). The
last major change occurred in 1959 with the passage of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act (the Landrum-Griffin Act). 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
23. The first modem arbitration statute, the New York Arbitration Act of 1920, recognized that arbitrators were hearing and deciding issues of law, and that even though a
reviewing court of law could determine that the arbitrator made an error of law, the court
was not to set aside the arbitration award. Mentschikoff, supra n. 7, at 856. The principle
of limited judicial review was carried forward in the FAA and the MUAA. The reviewing
court was to honor the parties' agreement for the resolution of their dispute, and the court
was to enforce the arbitrator's decision, even if it was based on a point of law on which the
court would have reached a different decision. Enforcement of contracts was given priority
over technical accuracy as to the state of the law. Infra nn. 87-92.
24. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000).
26. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
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"public policy" defense against the enforcement of arbitration
27
agreements as to statutory claims under the FAA.
Only four years later, the Court departed from Wilko in a
union-management arbitration case, holding that public law
28
claims arising from collective agreements were to be arbitrated.
The Court based its holding on the Labor-Management Relations
Act 29 rather than on the FAA. In the 1960 Steelworkers Trilogy,
the Court strongly endorsed the arbitration of union-management
30
disputes.
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
which prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 3 1 These protections were
later extended to age, 3 2 pregnancy, 33 and disability. 34 State legislatures, including Montana's, enacted parallel statutes, 35 and
state courts later began offering contract and tort claims for
wrongful discharge. 36 These employee rights, based on public law
rather than an employment contract, presented a new question:
would the U.S. Supreme Court enforce union-management agreements requiring arbitration of these new public law claims? 3 7
27. E.g. Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P.Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir.
1968).
28. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 458 (1957); see
also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
29. Textile Workers Union of Am., 353 U.S. at 451 (citing Labor-Management Relations
Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1947), replaced by 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000))) (stating that
"the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes, contained in this collective bargaining
agreement, should be specifically enforced"). The Labor-Management Relations Act provides for alleged contract breach issues to be brought in federal district court. The Court
determined that the Act is the enforcement mechanism for a pre-dispute arbitration provision contained in a collective agreement. Id. at 454-55.
30. See United Steelworkers of Am. v.Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566-67 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v.Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960); Warrior
& GulfNav. Co, 363 U.S. at 582 (1960) (Steelworkers Trilogy).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
34. Id. at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(1) to (b)(4).
35. R. Bales, A New Directionfor American Labor Law: IndividualAutonomy and the
Compulsory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights, 30 Hous. L. Rev. 1863, 1877
(1994) (citing Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39-2-901 to -915 (1993)).
36. Id. at 1877-78.
37. See generally Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns:A Changingof
the Guard, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 7, 7 (1988) (noting that the principal source of worker protection
was shifting from contractual rights negotiated through collective bargaining agreements
to law-created individual employment rights).
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In the 1974 case Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,38 the
Court held that when an employee brought a Title VII gender discrimination claim under the "just cause" clause in a collective bargaining contract, the "just cause" arbitration did not preclude subsequent judicial litigation of the gender discrimination claim. 39
The Court, refusing to defer to arbitration, cited the informality of
arbitral procedures, the lack of labor arbitrator expertise on issues
of substantive law, and the absence of written opinions as reasons
40
for rejecting arbitration.
Then, in 1985, 1987, and 1989, in three cases known collectively as the Mitsubishi Trilogy,4 1 the Court overruled Wilko and
42
enforced arbitration agreements covering public law claims.
The Court declared that "we are well past the time when judicial
suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence
of arbitration as
of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development
43
an alternative means of dispute resolution."
The next development occurred in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,44 in which the Court held that the FAA allowed
an employer to require a non-union employee to arbitrate, rather
than litigate, a federal age discrimination claim when the employee signed a pre-dispute arbitration agreement as an employment condition. 4 5 The Court quoted Mitsubishi's reasoning: "[bly
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." 46 Thus,
objections to arbitration based on substantive or procedural unconscionability or other general contract defenses must be ad38. Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
39. Id. at 51-52, 59-60. Almost all union-management contracts contain a "just cause"
clause, which requires the employer to prove "justcause" for any disciplinary action. Thus,
if an employer discharges an employee for disciplinary reasons, and the employee alleges
that the asserted disciplinary reason was pretext to hide a real reason of gender discrimination, the employee asserts that the employer did not have 'just cause" for discipline and
that the discharge violated Title VII because it was unlawful sex discrimination.
40. Id. at 56-58.
41. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (Mitsubishi Trilogy).
42. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 484-86 (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953));
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 242; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 639-40.
43. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27.
44. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
45. Id. at 26.
46. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
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dressed on a case-by-case basis.47 Implicit in the Court's holding
was a determination that the procedures afforded at arbitration
met the minimum substantive rights of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA),48 thereby rebutting the employee's allegations of unconscionability and procedural unfairness. 49 Although the Court did not provide guidance as to the minimum
standards that would generally satisfy these or similar employee
allegations, lower federal courts have since attempted to provide
50
such guidance.
In 1998, in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,51 the
Court addressed whether a union-management agreement's arbitration clause could prospectively waive an employee's right to litigate a statutory discrimination claim. 52 The Court held that such
a waiver could occur only if it was "clear and unmistakable." 53
Two years later, in Green Tree FinancialCorp. v. Randolph,54 the
Court considered whether an arbitration clause is void for being
unconscionable if the arbitration would be prohibitively expensive
compared with judicial litigation. 55 There, the Court held the
plaintiff "bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring
such costs."

56

One of the most important issues regarding non-union-management employment arbitration during this period was whether
the FAA applied to employment arbitration. The FAA provides
that it does not apply to "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce." 57 The concern was whether this provision exempted employment contracts from arbitration, and most
circuit courts concluded that the "employee contract" exception
was limited to employees who work directly in interstate com47. Id. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627) ("Courts should remain attuned to
well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any contract.' ").
48. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (Supp. 1965-1968).
49. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
50. Bales, supra n. 2, at 625-26.
51. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
52. Id. at 72.
53. Id. at 80 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
54. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
55. Id. at 90.
56. Id. at 92.

57. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol68/iss2/9

10

Corbett: Arbitrating Employment Law Disputes

2007

ARBITRATING EMPLOYMENT LAW DISPUTES

425

merce. 58 Nevertheless, a three-member panel of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that "the FAA does not apply to labor or
''5 9
employment contracts.

In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 60 the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the FAA, holding that
the FAA exempts only the employees specified-"seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"-and does not exempt all employment contracts. 61 The Court determined that, except for certain workers
who are engaged in actual interstate transportation (for example,
truck drivers), the FAA requires employees subject to pre-dispute
arbitration clauses to arbitrate their employment-related
62
claims.
Additionally, pre-dispute arbitration agreements are valid
and enforceable, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract [term]."63 The Supreme

Court has stated that the FAA "is a congressional declaration of a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary."64 The effect of this policy "is to create a body of federal
substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration
agreement within the coverage of the [FAA],"65 that both state

and federal courts must enforce. 66 There is a presumption "in
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, de-

58. E.g. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container,Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 882-85 (4th Cir.
1996).
59. Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999). The dissenter
would have followed the majority of circuits and reached the opposite conclusion. Id. at
1094-95 (Brunetti, J., dissenting). Previously, the Ninth Circuit held that even though an
employment agreement contained a provision requiring the arbitration of Title VII claims
(race, sex, national origin, color, and religion), an employee could not be compelled to arbitrate such a claim. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1196 (9th Cir.
1998), certioraridenied, 585 U.S. 989 (1998) and 525 U.S. 996 (1998). The court determined that in the 1991 amendments to Title VII, Congress intended to preclude compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims and other statutory discrimination disputes. Id. See
also Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 1999) (refusing to
follow Duffield).
60. Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
61. Id. at 109 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1).
62. Id. at 119.
63. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (emphasis added).
64. Moses H. Cone Meml. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
65. Id.
66. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (citations omitted).
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lay, or a like defense to arbitrability."6 7 Further, while "generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements
without contravening § 2 [of the FAA] ,"68 neither state nor federal
courts may refuse to enforce "arbitration agreements under state
69
laws applicable only to arbitration provisions."
D.

The Current Tension of Arbitration

In the employment dispute context, arbitrators continue to
decide traditional private law disputes by applying rules of decision based on industry standards. However, more frequently they
are also called upon to decide disputes by interpreting and applying public law using judicially- or legislatively-defined procedural
standards.
The growth of public law in employment arbitration has occurred because (1) it provides rights and obligations for the contracting parties apart from their underlying contractual agreement when their arbitration agreement requires the arbitration of
"any and all" disputes; 70 and (2) the parties frequently include
language in their employment agreement incorporating public
law, such as a provision providing that the agreement shall be
construed consistent with a general or specified federal or state
law.

71

Consequently, an employment arbitrator often interprets and
applies both industry standards and public law, and must address
67. Moses H. Cone Meml. Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25.
68. Drs. Assocs. Inc. v.Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (citations omitted); see also
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2).
69. Drs.Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687 (refusing to enforce Montana state law applicable only
to arbitration provisions).
70. Integration of public law into a contract through an "any and all" dispute arbitration clause is also applicable to contracts between consumers and merchants or other suppliers of goods and services. Consumer law, like employment law, is of recent origin, and
designed to protect classes of individuals vis-&-vis their contract counterparts who have
more bargaining power and usually dictate the contract terms. Particularly in the employment context, the development of the law has focused in providing employees' rights well
beyond concerns an individual employee has. These rights include protections from discrimination on the basis of gender, race, and religion, 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-17
(2000); age, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34; disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) to (b)(4); union support,
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87; health and safety protection, Id. at §§ 651-78; pension and benefit
assurances, Id. at §§ 1001-1461; medical leave, Id. at § 2601-54; work place privacy, Id. at
§§ 2001-09; and protection in the event of plant shutdowns and relocations, Id. at
§§ 2101-09.
71. For example, a law prohibiting discrimination based on gender, race, age, health
and safety standards, pension and benefit protections, etc. See supra n. 59.
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any inconsistencies between the specific contract language, the industry standards, and public law. In the union-management context, the actual language of the disputants' contract and industry
standards continue to play a dominant role in arbitration, although the use of public law is on the rise. In the non-union-management context, public law plays a more dominant role because
there are often no widely-accepted industry- or arbitrator-devel72
oped standards that collectively form the "rules of decision."
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that, with regard to predispute arbitration in public law disputes, parties have not waived
any substantive rights but only the judicial forum.7 3 Thus the employer, as drafter of the pre-dispute arbitration clause covering
public law disputes, must assure that the arbitration process is
fair and appropriate to an individual employee relative to the nature of the dispute.
II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

Judicial intervention to assure that the arbitration process is
fair and appropriate occurs at two points: (1) at the time a party
seeks enforcement of the arbitration provision; 74 and (2) after the
arbitrator's decision is rendered on judicial review. 75 The enforcement proceeding generally occurs after a dispute has arisen and
one party refuses to arbitrate. The judicial review proceeding occurs after the arbitration hearing upon the parties' receipt of the
arbitrator's award.
A.

Initial Judicial Intervention

Initial judicial intervention may occur in several contexts: (1)
the allegedly aggrieved party sidesteps the arbitration agreement
and takes her claim directly to court; (2) the allegedly aggrieved
party seeks to arbitrate her claim and the other party refuses, al72. Certainly, there are exceptions. An individual employment agreement may explicitly or implicitly incorporate industry standards, such as an employment agreement of a
professional healthcare provider, a baseball player, or a corporate executive. But in nonunion-management arbitration, particularly when compared with union-management arbitration, the rules of decision are almost entirely public law.
73. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
74. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-115 (2005). An even earlier opportunity for judicial intervention may occur prior to a dispute if a party seeks a declaratory
order as to the validity of the arbitration agreement. 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
75. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1925); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 27-5-311 to -313.
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leging that the procedural preconditions to arbitration have not
been satisfied; 7 6 (3) one party seeks to arbitrate and the other
party refuses, asserting that the claim is not arbitrable (the claim
is not subject to arbitration under the arbitration agreement and
the decision regarding arbitrability is for a court to make);7 7 or (4)
one party seeks to arbitrate and the other party refuses, alleging
that the arbitration provision or the contract in which it is contained is voidable based on a contract law defense.7 8 In any of
these situations, the party seeking arbitration must either petition a court for an order compelling arbitration or, when the other
party has initiated a court proceeding on her claim, move the
court to dismiss the plaintiffs claim and compel arbitration.
1. Enforcement under the Montana Uniform ArbitrationAct
and the FederalArbitrationAct
The Montana Uniform Arbitration Act (MTUAA) 7 9 provides
that if one party to an arbitration clause refuses to arbitrate, the
other party may sue in Montana district court to compel arbitration.8 0 Alternatively, if a party believes that it is not required to
arbitrate, it may bring a district court action to stay the arbitration proceeding.8 1 Similarly, the FAA8 2 provides that a federal
3
district court may enter an order to compel or stay arbitration.
The court, however, may not use the proceeding to address the
merits of the controversy. Rather, its function is solely to deter76. Infra section II.D.1.
77. Infra section II.D.2.
78. E.g., fraud, incapacity, duress, undue influence, misrepresentation, mistake, unconscionability, breach of good faith and fair dealing, etc. Infra section II.B.2.
79. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-113. The MTUAA does not generally apply to arbitration
agreements "between employers and employees or between their respective representatives," unless the parties' agreement "so specifies," but certain provisions are applicable to
all such agreements. Id. One provision that is applicable to all arbitration agreements
provides that a Montana district court may compel arbitration when a party, pursuant to
an agreement to arbitrate, refuses to do so. Id. at § 27-5-115. In addition to enforcing
agreements to arbitrate, the other provisions of the act that are applicable to employee and
employer arbitration agreements are as follows: (1) the authority to stay an arbitration
proceeding where there is no arbitration agreement (Id. at § 27-5-115(2)); (2) the authority
to confirm the award of an arbitrator (Id. at § 27-5-311); (3) the authority to vacate an
arbitration award (Id. at § 27-5-312(1), -312(3) to -312(5)); and (4) the authority to modify
or correct an award (Id. at § 27-5-313).
80. Id. at § 27-5-115(1).
81. Id. at § -115(2); see also Intl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, Loc. 1638 v. Mont.
Power Co., 929 P.2d 839, 842-43 (Mont. 1996).
82. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
83. Id. at §§ 3-4.
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mine whether the dispute comes within the arbitration clause
and, if so, the merits of the dispute are then referred to arbitra84
tion.
As discussed previously, in construing the FAA, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the question of "who" (the court or
the arbitrator) is to decide the issue of substantive arbitrability
depends on the language of the arbitration agreement.8 5 If the
agreement directs the arbitrator to decide the issue, then a court
cannot make that decision.8 6 The Court stated that when looking
at the language of an agreement,
[clourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is "clear and unmistakable" evidence that they
did so. In this manner the law treats silence or ambiguity about the
question "who (primarily) should decide arbitrability" differently
from the way it treats silence or ambiguity about the question
"whether a particular merits-related dispute is arbitrable because it
is within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement"-for in respect
to this latter question the law reverses the presumption .... The

latter question arises when the parties
have a contract that pro87
vides for arbitration of some issues.

The FAA is generally applicable to Montana employment contracts for two reasons: (1) the MTUAA on its face is inapplicable
in the employment context unless the arbitration agreement spec84. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006). The Court
stated that "[cihallenges to the validity of arbitration agreements 'upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,' can be divided in two types. One
type challenges specifically the validity of the agreement to arbitrate .... The other challenges the contract as a whole, either on a ground that directly affects the entire agreement
(e.g., the agreement was fraudulently induced), or on the ground that the illegality of one of
the contract's provisions renders the whole contract invalid." Id. at 444 (citations omitted).
For example, "if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself-an
issue which goes to the making of the agreement to arbitrate-the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it. But ...[a court may not] consider claims of fraud in the inducement
of the contract generally." Id. at 444-45 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967)). See also Martz v. Beneficial Mont., Inc., 135 P.3d
790, 792-95 (Mont. 2006) (adopting Buckeye's language and reasoning); Ratchye v. Lucas,
957 P.2d 1128, 1133 (Mont. 1998) (holding that under Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-115(5), the
lower court did not have jurisdiction to enter summary judgment on certain aspects of the
underlying dispute once it was determined that those disputes fell within the arbitration
clause).
85. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 944-45 (brackets and citations omitted). Indeed, the Court held that if the
issue of substantive arbitrability arises in state court, the state court "should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts" to determine whether the
parties objectively revealed an intent as to whether an arbitrator or a court is to determine
the issue of arbitrability. Id. at 944.
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ifies its applicability;"" and (2) the FAA generally preempts the
MTUAA. 8 9 As discussed above, 90 the FAA is applicable to all employees whose employment contracts evidence interstate commerce, except employees actually engaged in the movement of
goods in commerce. 9 1 Alternatively, because the FAA is inapplicable to public sector (governmental) employment agreements, the
MTUAA should apply to Montana state and subdivision employees subject to arbitration agreements when the agreements state
92
the MTUAA is applicable.
88. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-113 (2005).
Arbitration agreements between employers and employees or between their respective representatives are valid and enforceable and may be subject to all or
portions of this chapter if the agreement so specifies, except 27-5-115 [providing for
subpoenas, and depositions of witnesses]; 27-5-311 [providing for court modification or correction of an arbitrator award]; 27-5-312 (1) and (3) through (5) [court
vacating an award; limitations period for seeking vacation; if the award is vacated,
provision for rehearing before arbitrators; court order confirming an award]; 27-5313 [modification or correction of an award]; and 27-5-322 [providing for state district court jurisdiction] apply in each case.
Id. (emphasis added).
89. The Court has determined that the FAA is applicable to state courts. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); but see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 282-85 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (expressing concern about the Court's
determination). The FAA preempts contrary state law. Drs. Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto,517
U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (determining that the venue provision of the MTUAA was inconsistent
with the FAA and was thus preempted). Consequently, if the MTUAA, another Montana
statute, or Montana common law is inconsistent with the FAA, that Montana law would be
preempted.
Alternatively, if the parties include in the arbitration agreement a choice-of-law provision stating that state law is to apply to their agreement, then state law is applicable. Volt
Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior U., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)
(finding no FAA preemption of the state arbitration law when the parties agree to abide by
state rules on arbitration). The Volt decision was limited in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995). Mastrobuono concluded that, in conflicts between
state law under the choice-of-law provision and the arbitration clause, state law covers the
rights and duties of the parties, while the arbitration clause covers the arbitration. The
arbitration provision provided that the arbitrator could issue punitive damages whereas
state law did not authorize punitives. Id.
90. See supra n. 61 and accompanying text.
91. For some period of time, there was confusion whether the FAA was applicable to
employment arbitration, but the Court later adopted the position of the majority of U.S.
Courts of Appeals that the FAA exempts only the classification of employees specified,
which are seamen, railroad employees, or others who work directly in interstate commerce.
Cir. City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
92. I have not found any cases where this issue has been raised, but I believe, first, that
when the FAA was enacted in 1925, Congress did not intend to regulate the relationship
between a state and its employees. Second, the FAA was enacted under the Commerce
Clause and, at the time the statute was enacted, the Commerce Clause would not have
reached states vis-a-vis their own employees. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, ConstitutionalLaw: Principles and Policies § 3.3, 247-50 (3d ed., Aspen Publishers 2006) (discussing the interpretation of the Commerce Clause before 1937). Third, Commerce Clause ju-
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2. Defenses to Judicial Enforcement of an Arbitration
Agreement
Both the MTUAA and the FAA provide that an arbitration
agreement may be voided "upon grounds that exist in law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."93 Thus, while arbitration agreements are presumptively valid and enforceable, a court
may refuse to enforce them, like any other contract provision,
based on fraud, incapacity, duress, undue influence, misrepresentation, mistake, unconscionability, or breach of the duty of good
faith.9 4 Like other state courts, the Montana Supreme Court has
consistently refused to enforce arbitration agreements on the
same grounds generally used as contract enforcement defenses,
including that the contract is an unlawful contract of adhesion. 95
Federal courts have acted similarly. 9 6 The topic of unlawful adhesive employment arbitration agreements is discussed below.
B.
1.

Post-Award JudicialIntervention

The Basis for JudicialIntervention

After the arbitrator's award is delivered, a party may seek judicial intervention: (1) to modify or correct the award; 97 (2) to va99
cate the award;98 or (3) to confirm the award.
A motion for "modification or correction" concerns matters
that do not change the merits of the award, e.g., clerical mistakes,
risprudence, especially in recent years with the Court's concern for the Tenth Amendment
and federalism, arguably indicates that states as employers are not regulated by the FAA.
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (stating a Missouri state law that set a
mandatory retirement age for state judges was not invalidated by the federal ADEA). In
Gregory, the Court determined that a federal law will be applied to important state government activities only if there is a clear statement from Congress that the law was meant to
apply. Id. at 464. Thereafter, in Kimel v. Fla. Bd.of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000), the
Court held that state governments cannot be sued for violating ADEA.
93. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-114 (2005).
94. See generally Drs. Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); John D.
Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts ch. 9 (5th ed., West Group 2003).
95. E.g. Iwen v. U.S. W. Direct, 977 P.2d 989, 994-95 (Mont. 1999) (stating that a predispute agreement is an unlawful contract of adhesion if (1) the arbitration clause is contained in a standardized form contract which was presented to the other party as take-itor-leave-it "without the opportunity to negotiate its terms"; and (2) the arbitration clause is
not within the weaker party's reasonable expectations). The clause in Iwen was "unduly
oppressive, unconscionable, or against public policy." Id.; see infra nn. 120-21, 158-60.
96. See generally Drs. Assocs., Inc., 517 U.S. 681.
97. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 27-5-313, 27-5-217; 9 U.S.C. § 11.
98. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-312; 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
99. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-311; 9 U.S.C. § 9.
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mistakes as to identity or description, or miscalculation of figures.
Alternatively, a motion to "vacate" challenges the validity of the
award, and requests the court to vacate or set aside the award. A
motion for "confirmation" requests that the court enter an order
confirming the award. The effect of a confirmation is that the prevailing party has a court order which, in the event of non-compliance, the party may execute and potentially seek a contempt order.
Judicial authority to vacate an arbitration award is limited.
The MTUAA "clearly does not authorize judicial review of arbitration awards on the merits of the controversy," 10 0 including the sufficiency of the evidence and misapplication of law. 1° 1 Arbitrator
partiality sufficient to cause an award to be vacated must be "certain, definite, and capable of demonstration: alleged partiality
which is remote, uncertain or speculative is insufficient." 0 2 Arbitral "misconduct" is demonstrated when the arbitrator or award
"manifests a disregard of the law."' 0 3 A manifest disregard for the
law "requires more than simply [the arbitrator's] misapplication of
the law. . . . [the arbitrator must] appreciate[] the existence of a
clearly governing legal principle but decide[] to ignore or pay no

attention to

it."104

If the remedy determined by the arbitrator

"has been rationally derived from the [arbitration] agreement it
10 5
will be upheld on review."
100. Duchscher v. Vaile, 887 P.2d 181, 184 (Mont. 1994); Hasbro, Inc. v. Catalyst USA,
Inc., 367 F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that, under the FAA, "as long as the arbitrator does not exceed [her] delegated authority," an arbitration award is to be confirmed
.even if [it] contains serious error of law or fact" (first set of brackets in original, second set
added)); Brabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons Inc., 376 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating
that arbitrariness and capriciousness are not grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award
under the FAA).
101. Terra W. Townhomes, LLC v. Stu Henkel Realty, 996 P.2d 866, 872 (Mont. 2000)
(holding that, for an arbitrator's award to be vacated under the manifest disregard test, the
arbitrator must be "aware of a clearly governing principle of Montana law, and blatantly
refuse[ ] to follow it" (quoting Geissler v. Sanem, 949 P.2d 234, 237-38 (Mont. 1997)).
102. May v. First Natl. Pawn Brokers, Ltd., 887 P.2d 185, 189 (Mont. 1994).
103. Geissler v. Sanem, 949 P.2d at 237.
104. Id. at 238-39 (citations omitted); Halligan v. PiperJaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 198
(2d Cir. 1998) (overturning an arbitrator's award under the FAA using the "manifest disregard" standard).
105. Paulsonv. FlatheadConserv. Dist., 91 P.3d 569, 574 (Mont. 2004) (quoting Terra W.
Townhomes, 996 P.2d at 871); Drayer v. Krasner,572 F.2d 348, 352 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating
that "the nonstatutory ground of 'manifest disregard' of the law as a basis for vacating
arbitration awards presupposed 'something beyond and different from a mere error in the
law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law' "(quoting san
Martine Companiade Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th
Cir. 1961))); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating that
"an arbitration award will not be vacated for a mistaken interpretation of law ... [blut if
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Additionally, a court may not vacate an arbitration award
based on the court's subjective judgment that the award would violate public policy. 10 6 The order must be based on "some explicit
public policy that is well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
10 7
general consideration of supposed public interest."
2. Non-Enforcement of Pre-DisputeArbitrationAgreementsGenerally
The FAA and the MTUAA were both enacted to reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration and to place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts. As noted
above, both the FAA and the MTUAA provide that an arbitration
108
agreement may be invalidated on traditional contract grounds.
In recent years, the leading issue in non-union-management arbitration is whether a pre-dispute arbitration provision of an employment agreement may be revoked under traditional defenses
against contract.1 0 9 Whether the provision is revocable because it
is unconscionable, and whether the opponent of arbitration has
waived any right to a judicial forum and jury trial are of particular
concern.' 1 0 The issue of unconscionability is generally a question
of state law.1 11
the arbitrators simply ignore the applicable law, the literal application of a 'manifest disregard' standard should presumably compel vacation of the award" (citations omitted)); Flexible Mfg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Super Prods. Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Gingiss
Intl. Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 333 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "insufficiency of the evidence is not a ground for setting aside an arbitration award under the FAA")).
106. United PaperworkersIntl. Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987).
107. Id. at 42 (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Loc. Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)); E.
Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57 (2000); Michael
H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, PrivateJusticein the Shadow of Public Courts: The Autonomy of
Workplace Arbitration Systems, 17 Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res. 19, 85 (2001).
108. Supra nn. 93-96 and accompanying text.
109. Pre-dispute arbitration is the norm in collectively bargained agreements, which are
not normally "contracts of adhesion." LaFournaise v. Mont. Developmental Ctr., 77 P.3d
202, 205 (Mont. 2003).
110. See e.g. Ingle v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172-74 (9th Cir. 2003).
111. Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Intl., Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 937 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that
"generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be
applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2 [of the FAA]") (citing
Drs. Assocs., Inc., v. Casarotto, 571 U.S. 681, 685 (1996); 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925)); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n. 9 (1987) ("[S]tate law, whether of legislative or of judicial
origin, is applicable [as a defense to the enforcement of an arbitration provision under the
FAA] if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally."); Ticknor, 265 F.3d at 939 (holding that Montana law rather
than Maryland law applied to the dispute despite the fact that the contract containing the
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The UnconscionableArbitration Provision

The unconscionability analysis focuses on both procedural unconscionability (unfair surprise) and substantive unconscionability (oppression). 1 12 Procedural unconscionability addresses "how"
the arbitration provision became part of the contract. The "how"
question concerns the balance of bargaining power between the
employer and the employee and how clearly the contract discloses
the presence and terms of the arbitration provision (unfair surprise). 1 13 The provision is procedurally unconscionable if the employee has relatively little comparative bargaining power and the
pre-dispute provision and its terms are not clearly disclosed and
understood. 114 Substantive unconscionability is the "whether"
question, asking in effect whether the substance and procedure
provided in the arbitration provision are oppressive or overly
harsh and against public policy (oppression).11 5
Most courts require that, for a contract or contract provision
to be struck for being unconscionable, there must be both procedural and substantive unconscionability. Thus, there must be imbalance in bargaining power, unfair surprise, and oppression.1 1 6 In
Montana, however, a contract provision may be struck as being
1 7
unconscionable if it suffers only procedural unconscionability. 1
While the Montana Supreme Court has not specifically relied on
arbitration clause provided that Maryland law was to apply). See also Cir.City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on Ticknor in determining whether an
arbitration provision was unconscionable under California law); lwen v. U.S. W. Direct, 977
P.2d 989, 994 (Mont. 1999).
112. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893 ("Under California law, a contract is unenforceable if it is
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable."); see also Calamari & Perillo, supra
n. 94, at 388-89 (explaining the use of the terms "substantive" and "procedural" unconscionability, "oppression," and "unfair surprise").
113. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893.
114. Id. A finding of procedural unconscionability may not be solely premised on the fact
that there was unequal bargaining power between the employer and the employee; c.f
Koss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 7 (Mont. 2002) ("[Mlere inequality in bargaining
power does not render a contract unenforceable, nor are all standardized contracts unenforceable. As a consequence of current commercial realities, form forum clauses will control, absent a strong showing it should be set aside."). Indeed, "if a court found procedural
unconscionability based solely on an employee's unequal bargaining power, that holding
could potentially apply to [invalidate] every contract of employment in our contemporary
economy." Zuver v. Airtouch Communs., Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 761 (Wash. 2004) (citing Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2002)) (brackets in original).
115. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893.
116. See Calamari & Perillo, supra n. 94, at 381; see also supra n. 113.
117. See Scott J. Burnham, The War against Arbitrationin Montana, 66 Mont. L. Rev.
139 (2005) (critiquing the Montana Supreme Court's approach to arbitration and constitutionality).
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the concepts of "procedural" and "substantive" in its analysis of
unconscionability, this terminology provides an appropriate construct to analyze the court's decisions.
D.

Unconscionability in Montana

The Montana Supreme Court relies on a three-part test to determine unconscionability. 1 1s The first two steps involve procedural unconscionability: 1) whether the contract provision is adhesive, and if adhesive, 2) whether the provision is within the reasonable expectation of the weaker party. The third step is to
determine whether the provision is unduly oppressive, unconscionable or against public policy (substantively unconscionable).11 9 If it is, it will be struck, even if the provision is within the
reasonable expectation of the weaker party.
1.

Procedural Unconscionability
a.

Adhesion-The Pre-DisputeArbitration Is Presented on
a "Take-It-or-Leave-It" Basis

In Iwen v. U.S. West Direct, the Montana Supreme Court defined the circumstance in which a contract becomes a contract of
adhesion. It said,
When determining whether a contract is one of adhesion, we focus
on the nature of the contracting process, rather than the parties'
relative sizes, resources, or bargaining power. Hence, we have held
that contracts of adhesion "arise when a standardized form agreement, usually drafted by the party having superior bargaining
power, is presented to a party, whose choice is either to accept or
reject the
contract without the opportunity to negotiate its
12 0
terms."

In Iwen, plaintiff challenged a pre-dispute arbitration provision included in a contract for a "yellow pages" advertisement.
Applying the above definition, the court held that the contract was
adhesive because plaintiff was faced with defendant's standardized form agreement, the terms of which were non-negotiable, and
his only choice was to accept or reject the contract as presented. 12 1
118. Iwen v. U.S. W. Direct, 977 P.2d 989, 995-96 (Mont. 1999).
119. Id. at 994-95. The Montana Supreme Court struck the arbitration clause because
it was "completely one-sided," allowing the company access to the court system, but requiring the customer to arbitrate. Id. at 996.
120. Id. at 989 (quoting Passage v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 727 P.2d 1298, 1301
(Mont. 1986)).
121. Id.
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Thereafter, in Koss v. Edward D. Jones,1 22 the Montana Supreme Court applied the same definition of adhesion in the context of a pre-dispute arbitration provision included in a stock brokerage agreement between a ninety-five year-old widow investor
and a brokerage house. 12 3 The court said that the provision was
adhesive because the investor was faced with an industry-wide
practice of including pre-dispute provisions in standardized brokerage contracts. In effect, the investor faced the possibility of being excluded from the securities market unless she accepted the
agreement with the pre-dispute clause. In addition, plaintiff had
no opportunity to negotiate the terms of the pre-dispute clause-it
124
was presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it-basis."'
12 5
A year later, in Arrowhead School DistrictNo. 75 v. Klyap,
the court applied its unconscionability analysis, not in the context
of a contract defense, but in determining whether a contract's 20%
liquidated damages provision was lawful. The court held that the
validity of a liquidated damages provision is governed by the same
standards applicable to the contract defense of unconscionability,
and then applied its unconscionability analysis. 126 It determined
that the liquidated damages provision was a contract of adhesion
because it was included in a form contract presented to teacher
Klyap by the School Board on a "take-it-or-leave-it basis," with no
"meaningful choice regarding the [contested] provision."' 2 7 The
court observed that there was no negotiation on the provision,
and, had Klyap sought to bargain the provision, "the School would
likely have rejected his proposal and simply hired a different
128
teacher. . . ." (there were eighty applicants).
The Montana Supreme Court's definition of adhesion is clear:
an adhesion contract "is a contract whose terms are dictated by
one contracting party to another who has no voice in its formulation.' 2 9 This take-it-or-leave-it approach is particularly onerous
when the weaker party is presented with an industry-wide prac0
tice and there are no alternatives but to enter into the contract.13
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont 2002).
Id. at 7.
Id.; see also Denton v. FirstInterstateBank of Com., 142 P.3d 797, 803 (Mont. 2006).
Arrowhead Sch. Dist. No. 75 v. Klyap, 79 P.3d 250 (Mont. 2003).
Id. at 263, 265.
Id. at 265.
Id.
Denton, 142 P.3d at 803.
Kloss v.Edward D. Jones, 54 P.3d 1, 8 (Mont 2002).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol68/iss2/9

22

Corbett: Arbitrating Employment Law Disputes

2007

ARBITRATING EMPLOYMENT LAW DISPUTES

437

However, the court has been clear that "form" contract language offered by the stronger party alone is not sufficient to constitute adhesion. In Denton v. FirstInterstateBank of Commerce,
the court determined that a form loan agreement tendered by the
bank to the borrower and co-signor was not a contract of adhesion.
Unlike the ninety-five-year-old widow in Kloss, the co-signor was
a "sophisticated business person" who had "studied" the proposed
agreement, the transaction was entered at his behest, there was
no evidence that the defendant bank would not have negotiated
the offending clause if the plaintiff had sought negotiation, and
finally, that if plaintiff had sought negotiation, the bank would
have negotiated the contract because plaintiff was such a valued
13 1
client.
In the employment context, many employees are sophisticated and are more than capable of negotiating the terms of their
employment agreement, including a pre-dispute arbitration
clause, despite the fact that the employer may have superior overall bargaining power. Alternatively, an employer who presents
pre-dispute arbitration, especially to non-sophisticated employees,
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, will probably have the provision
struck. To combat this, the employer may, in its efforts to make
the provision known and understood, 13 2 offer additional consideration for an employee to accept the pre-dispute provision. In such
a setting, the employee may reject the consideration and refuse to
sign. Alternatively, it may be anticipated that most employees
will accept the consideration and sign.
b.

Is the Arbitration Provision within the Reasonable
Expectation of the Challenging Party?

Assuming the court concludes that the offending contract or
contract provision is adhesive, the second step in the unconscionable analysis is to determine whether the adhesive clause or contract was beyond the "reasonable expectation" of the challenging
party.
In Kloss, the court determined that a pre-dispute arbitration
provision was adhesive,1 3 3 and then concluded that the adhesive
131. Denton, 142 P.3d at 803.
132. Infra section II.D.1.c.
133. Id. at 7-8; see also Denton, 142 P.3d at 803 (stating that the contracts in Koss were
adhesion contracts because, among other things, "they were standardized form contracts
prepared by [the brokerage house], and [the plaintiff] had no meaningful opportunity to
negotiate the terms of the contracts").
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language was unconscionable because it was not within "the reasonable expectation" of the plaintiff.1 3 4 In support of the latter
conclusion, the court stated that it was the practice of the parties
that the widow did not read her brokerage agreements; the widow
relied upon the broker to explain any significant provisions within
such an agreement; the widow, in conformity with this practice,
did not read the brokerage agreement at issue; the broker did not
note or explain the pre-dispute clause; and finally, the broker
owed the widow a fiduciary duty to explain the brokerage agree135
ment.
In Klyap,'136 the court again visited the "reasonable expectation" test, this time with regard to the validity of a 20% liquidated
damages provision in a contract. The court concluded that the
provision was valid because (1) the provision was within Klyap's
reasonable expectation because he was familiar with the employment needs of the school, 13 7 and (2) the amount of damages the
138
school would suffer upon his breach would be difficult to prove.
In Denton,13 9 the court concluded that the promissory note between the bank and the borrower/co-signor was within the co-signor's reasonable expectation because he was a "sophisticated
business person who had studied the proposed agreement, [and]
140
the transaction was entered at his behest."
c. Additional Criteriato Determine Reasonable Expectation
Generally, for a pre-dispute arbitration clause in the nonunion-management context' 4 ' to be within the reasonable expectation of an employee or prospective employee, the clause must be
134. Kloss, 54 P.3d at 8.
135. Id. at 10 (not reaching whether the provision was unduly oppressive, unconscionable or against public policy due to the finding that the provision was not within the plaintiffs reasonable expectation).
136. Arrowhead Sch. Dist. No. 75 v. Klyap, 79 P.3d 250 (Mont. 2003).
137. Id. at 267 (noting that Klyap knew when he breached his employment contract that
a small, rural school would have difficulty replacing him in his coaching and teaching positions so close to the start of a school year).
138. Id.
139. Denton v. FirstInterstateBank of Com., 142 P.3d 797 (Mont. 2006).
140. Id. at 803.
141. See La Fournaisev. Mont. Developmental Ctr., 77 P.3d 202, 205 (Mont. 2003) (stating that "collective bargaining agreements arise only after the public employer and the
exclusive representative of the union have met their legal duties to bargain collectively and
in good faith .. no standardized form of agreement exists in this case and neither contracting party dictated the terms of the [contract] to the other. Consequently, the requirements for a contract of adhesion ... have not been met." (citation omitted)).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol68/iss2/9

24

Corbett: Arbitrating Employment Law Disputes

2007

ARBITRATING EMPLOYMENT LAW DISPUTES

439

in writing, be conspicuous, and by its language reasonably inform
an employee of its presence and its terms, and the employer must
be willing to discuss its implications.
Courts have found the following practices to represent employer procedural unfairness: (1) the terms are "set forth in such a
way that an average person could not understand them";14 2 (2) the
agreement is included in employees' paycheck envelopes; 143 (3) the
agreement is posted on the employer's website, and the employer
is unable to prove that its employees are aware of it;'14 (4) the
employer sends the agreement via a mass e-mail; 4 5 (5) the employer prepares the agreement in English for Spanish-speaking
employees; 4 6 (6) the employer gives the employee an insufficient
amount of time to consider the pre-dispute agreement before signing it;14 7 (7) the agreement is buried among many employmentrelated forms 148 or "hidden in a maze of fine print";14 9 (8) the
agreement refers to arbitration rules to which the employee is denied access; 150 and (9) the employer refuses to respond to em142. Zuver v. Airtouch Communs., Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 760-61 (Wash. 2004).
143. Compare Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002) (enforcing arbitration agreement) with Buckley v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 958, 965
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (refusing to enforce arbitration agreement).
144. Acher v. Fujitsu Network Communs., Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 26, 37 (D. Mass. 2005).
145. Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Govt. Sys. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 142, 149 (D. Mass.
2004) (holding that an employer's mass e-mail message to employees was insufficient notice).
146. Prevot v. PhillipsPetroleum Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 937, 939-41 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (refusing to enforce the arbitration agreement); see also Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Lang,
321 F.3d 533, 538-39 (5th Cir. 2003) (refusing to enforce an agreement involving an illiterate borrower in a consumer arbitration case).
147. Zuver, 103 P.3d at 761. A similar consideration requires employers to afford employees a reasonable period of time to opt out of signed provisions. See e.g. Cir. City Stores,
Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding an arbitration agreement that
gave employee the ability to opt out of arbitration was not procedurally unconscionable);
Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp. 2d 377, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (refusing to enforce the arbitration agreement where employer gave employee only a few minutes to review a single-spaced agreement).
148. See e.g. Berger v. Cantor Fitzgerald Secs., 942 F. Supp. 963, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(refusing to enforce the arbitration agreement); Maye v.Smith Barney Inc., 897 F. Supp.
100, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (enforcing the arbitration agreement); see also Shaffer v. ACS
Govt. Servs., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 682, 687 (D. Md. 2004) (refusing to enforce the arbitration clause contained on one page of a seventy-one page employee guidebook).
149. Zuver, 103 P.3d at 760 (quoting Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 544 P.2d 20, 23
(Wash. 1975)).
150. E.g. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1999) (refusing to
enforce the arbitration agreement where the arbitration rules were contained in a separate
document to which employees were not given access until after a dispute had arisen); cf.
Tarulli v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 151, 157-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding the
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ployee questions or concerns about the agreement. 15 1 An additional consideration is whether the employer had an affirmative
duty to note and explain the pre-dispute arbitration provision in
the first instance, in which case an employee need not inquire
about the provision-rather, the employer has the obligation to
15 2
raise the issue.
d.

The Reasonable Expectation Test May Be Both Objective
and Subjective

Finally, the "reasonable expectation" test is potentially both
subjective (whether the pre-dispute clause is within the reasonable expectation of the particular plaintiff) 153 and objective
(whether the pre-dispute clause is within the reasonable expectation of a reasonable person). 5 4 A pre-dispute clause not within
the reasonable expectation of a reasonable person is valid, if the
individual plaintiff actually knew and understood the provision. 15 5 Alternatively, if the plaintiff did not know or understand,
but a reasonable person employed in the same position would
have known and understood, absent the defendant's knowledge of
plaintiff's reduced capacity, plaintiff may not complain. 156 Consequently, the duty on the employer, absent plaintiffs actual knowlarbitration agreement is not unconscionable where agreement stated that the applicant
must request a copy of the arbitration rules if she had not received a copy).
151. Zuver, 103 P.3d at 761 (stating that the employee "had ample opportunity to contact ... [the employer or its attorney] with concerns or questions").
152. In the non-employment context, specifically a stockbroker's duty to a client, the
Montana Supreme Court determined that the broker had a fiduciary duty to disclose and
explain the pre-dispute arbitration clause in the account agreement. Kloss v. Edward D.
Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 9 (Mont. 2002); see also Willems v. U.S. Bancorp PiperJaffray, Inc.,
107 P.3d 465, 468-69 (Mont. 2005) (suggesting that the relevant question in the context of
pre-dispute employment arbitration is whether an employer ever had a "fiduciary duty" to
an employee).
153. Denton v. FirstInterstate Bank of Com., 142 P.3d 797, 803 (Mont. 2006) (finding no
contract of adhesion where the plaintiff was not unsophisticated as was the plaintiff in
Kloss, and where the plaintiff had "studied the contract prior to signing it"); Kioss, 54 P.3d
at 3, 8 (examining the reasonable expectation of the ninety-five year-old widow).
154. Zigrang v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 123 P.3d 237, 241 (Mont. 2005). The
inquiry into an investor's reasonable expectations in an adhesion contract consists only of
an analysis of the investor's objectively reasonable expectations from the investor's perspective-from the layman perspective, not that of the sophisticated stockbroker. "IT]he
mere presence of an arbitration provision in an investment agreement, though conspicuous, does not bring the provision within the reasonable expectations of an investor in every
instance." Id. at 241-42. For a critique of the Montana Supreme Court's use of subjective
criteria in deciding "reasonable expectation," see Burnham, supra n. 117.
155. Denton, 142 P.3d at 803.
156. Id.
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edge, is to make the pre-dispute provision known to the reasonable person working the position. If plaintiff has diminished capacity, and the employer is aware of this situation, the employer must
make special efforts to inform plaintiff.
2.

Substantive Unconscionability

The third step in the Montana courts' analysis of unconscionability is to determine whether the challenged language is oppressive, overly harsh or against public policy. If so, and if the
contract is adhesive, even if the pre-dispute clause is within the
challenging party's reasonable expectation, the clause is voidable.
This is what many courts refer to as substantive unconscionability.
In Iwen, 15 7 (involving the yellow pages advertisement contract), the court determined that the pre-dispute arbitration provision was unduly oppressive (unreasonably favorable to the defendant) because it was "completely one-sided." The contract required the plaintiff arbitrate contract disputes whereas the
defendant could choose a judicial forum. 158 This contract characteristic is widely accepted as constituting substantive unconscio59
nability.
a.

Criteriato Determine Substantive Unconscionability

In Kloss, the Montana Supreme Court struck the pre-dispute
clause because it was not within the plaintiffs reasonable expectation. However, it suggested eight criteria for determining future
questions of substantive unconscionability.1 60 These criteria can
be reduced to the following five factors:
157. Iwen v. U.S. W. Direct, 977 P.2d 989 (Mont 1999).
158. Id. at 995-96.
159. Infra n. 165.
160. Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 8-9 (Mont. 2002) (indicating the criteria
are only examples). The eight criteria are:
1. Are potential arbitrators disproportionately employed in one or the other
party's field of business?
2. Do arbitrators tend to favor "repeat players" as opposed to workers or consumers who are unlikely to be involved in arbitration again? In other words, is
there a tendency by arbitrators to avoid decisions which will result in the loss
of future contracts for their services?
3. What are the filing fees for arbitration compared to the filing fees in Montana's district courts?
4. What are arbitrator's fees? Do they make small claims prohibitive? Do they
discriminate against consumers or workers of modest means?
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1. Whether the arbitrator or potential arbitrator is biased and has
a conflict of interest. For example, whether the arbitrator is disproportionately employed in the employer's field of business, or
tends to favor employer "repeat players" (usually the em16
ployer). 1
2. Whether the cost of arbitration is excessive compared to judicial
litigation-in effect, whether the total cost of arbitration is oppressive or otherwise precludes the particular employee from
availing herself of arbitration.
3. Whether the arbitration proceeding is "shrouded in secrecy so
as to conceal illegal, oppressive or wrongful" employer practices.
4. Whether arbitrators are bound by the facts and law.
5. Whether employees have the right to discover the facts neces162
sary to prove their claims.

b.

Additional Criteria to Determine Substantive
Unconscionability

Other courts have cited and relied upon the criteria suggested
in Kloss, 16 3 as well as the following additional criteria:
5.
6.
7.
8.

Are arbitration proceedings shrouded in secrecy so as to conceal illegal, oppressive or wrongful business practices?
To what extent are arbitrators bound by the law?
To what extent are arbitrators bound by the facts?
What opportunity to claimants have to discover the facts necessary to prove a
claim such as a company's business practices?

Id.
161. Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten: Twenty Unresolved
Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res. 165, 190, 190 n. 187
(2005) ("Unlike union-management arbitration, where both parties are repeat players, in
the non-union-management context only the employer has the potential to be a repeat
player. The concern with repeat players is that such a player has better information on
potential arbitrators and that arbitrators may tend to favor the repeat player to assure
repeat business.").
162. Kloss, 54 P.3d at 9.
163. Factor 1 (arbitrator bias): Hootersof Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th
Cir. 1999) (finding that the arbitrator selection process was biased because, among other
things, the employer unilaterally controlled the pool of arbitrators); Parillav. LAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 283 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that a geographical exclusion
of arbitrators did not create a biased arbitrator selection process); see also Bales, supra n.
161, at 193-94 (discussing whether disclosure of a conflict of interest is sufficient to cure
the conflict); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitrationand Related Dispute Resolution Processes: What's Happening and What's Not, 56 U. Miami L. Rev. 949, 960-61
(2002); Harding, supra n. 1, at 454.
Factor 2 (cost of the arbitration process): Ingle v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165,
1177 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a $75 filing fee rendered arbitration agreement unenforceable); Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 765 (5th Cir. 1999) (enforcing
arbitral award on plaintiff); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000)
(determining that, where "a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the
ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of
showing the likelihood of incurring such costs"). Since Green Tree, courts have evaluated
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fee-splitting provisions on a case-by-ease basis, and have required employees to demonstrate that they cannot afford the cost of arbitration. E.g. Faber v. Menard,Inc., 367 F.3d
1048, 1053 (8th Cir. 2004); Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 608 (3d Cir. 2002);
Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Intl., 324 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2003); Morrison v. Cir. City Stores,
317 F.3d 646, 668-70 (6th Cir. 2003); Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 785 (Wash.
2005) (holding that the employee plaintiff must present "specific information about the arbitration fees he will be required to share and why such fees would effectively prohibit him
from bringing his claims"); Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 992 (Cal. 2003) (upholding Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689 (Cal. 2000) (holding employers must pay all arbitration costs)); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgt. of Colo., Inc.,
163 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that mandatory fee splitting that required an
employee to pay half of the fees of the arbitration (between $1,875 and $5,000 including the
cost of the arbitrator) denied him access to effective forum); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 557-59 (4th Cir. 2001) (adopting a case-by-case approach to
plaintiffs allegation that the cost of arbitration was excessive when he was earning
$115,000 per year and could not demonstrate that contested cost-fee-splitting-would
cause him financial hardship).
Factor 3 (concealment): Zuver v. Airtouch Communs., Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 765 (Wash.
2004) (agreeing with the employer that confidentiality provisions were widespread in arbitration agreements, but holding that such a provision was substantively unconscionable
because it hindered employees' ability to prove a pattern of discrimination or to take advantage of prior arbitral findings). The court also noted that "keeping past findings secret
undermines an employee's confidence in the fairness and honesty of the arbitration process
and thus, potentially discourages that employee from pursuing a valid discrimination
claim." Id.
Factor 4 (facts and law): Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 640 (1985) (stating that, in the adjudication of statutory rights, the only difference between arbitration and judicial adjudication is the forum). Clearly, the arbitration
process must afford an opportunity for the fair presentation of evidence, and the arbitrator
must make fact findings based on that evidence. Similarly, the arbitrator must be true to
the law in the arbitration of statutory or common law rights and obligations. However, as
the Montana Supreme Court has recognized, courts may not second-guess arbitrator findings of fact or conclusions of law. Supra n. 101.
Factor 5 (discovery): Employees have the right to discover the facts necessary to prove
their claims. Most courts have resolved this issue by enforcing arbitration clauses that give
the arbitrator discretion to permit or limit discovery, but refusing to enforce clauses that
impose absolute limitations on discovery (e.g., each party is limited to one eight-hour deposition) or that forbid discovery altogether. See Wilks v. Pep Boys, 241 F. Supp. 2d 860,
864-65 (M.D. Tenn. 2003) (enforcing an arbitration agreement that presumptively limited
each party to the deposition of one witness and one expert, but permitted the arbitrator to
order additional depositions upon a showing of "substantial need"); Walker v. Ryan's Fam.
Steak Hs., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 916, 925-26 (M.D. Tenn. 2003) (refusing to enforce an
arbitration agreement that limited each party to one deposition and permitted the arbitrator to order additional depositions only "in extraordinary fact situations and for good cause
shown" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Williams v.Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 1996 WL
717447 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 1996) (enforcing arbitration award in favor of employer despite employee's argument that the arbitrator only permitted her to depose one of the four
witnesses she sought to depose); Contl. Airlines, Inc. v. Mason, 87 F.3d 1318, *2 (9th Cir.
1996) (table) (enforcing an arbitration clause, noting that "[tihere is nothing that shocks
the conscience about an arbitration procedure that does not provide for discovery"); Carter
v.Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 299 (5th Cir. 2004).
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1. Whether the arbitration agreement allows an employer access
to the courts for its claims164against the employee, but requires
the employee to arbitrate.
2. Whether the employer retains the unilateral right to modify the
165
arbitration agreement.
3. Whether the employer provides separate consideration to an existing employee when the employer seeks to include a pre-arbitration clause in the existing contractual relationship. 166
4. Whether the employer-initiated arbitration agreement imposes
67
a statute of limitations shorter than that imposed by law.1

164. Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding arbitration agreement enforceable where one party had option of litigating in court but other party
was required to arbitrate); Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126,
1130-32 (7th Cir. 1997) (refusing to enforce agreement by which employee, but not employer, agreed to arbitrate all future claims); Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d
1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that even where the arbitration clause requires both
parties to arbitrate, "because the possibility that [the employer] would initiate an action
against one of its employees is so remote," arbitration clauses are unenforceable unless
employer can show the arbitration clause is bilateral (quoting Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1174)); see
also Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 344 (Ky. App. 2001) (finding a
consumer arbitration agreement unenforceable when it applied only to claims brought by
the consumer against the company, and not vice-versa); Iwen v. U.S. W. Direct, 977 P.2d
989, 996 (Mont. 1999).
165. Hooters of Am., Inc., 173 F.3d at 939-40 (finding an arbitration agreement that
gives the employer the right to unilaterally modify arbitral procedures is unenforceable);
Floss v. Ryan's Fam. Steak Hs., Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 315-16 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding the
(employer's) right to alter the arbitration without notice or consent renders arbitration
agreement unenforceable); Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding "the unfettered right [of one party] to alter the arbitration agreement's existence
or its scope is illusory"); Blair, 283 F.3d at 604 (holding the employer's unilateral right to
modify the arbitrator's procedures upon notice to employee is enforceable).
166. Harmon v. PhilipMorris, Inc., 697 N.E.2d 270, 272 (Ohio App. 8th Dist. 1997) (finding no consideration where arbitration agreement required employees to arbitrate claims
against the employer but not vice-versa); cf. Dantz v. Am. Apple Group, LLC, 123 Fed.
Appx. 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (finding consideration present where both
employer and employee agreed to arbitrate claims against each other); Batory v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 124 Fed. Appx. 530, 533 (9th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (concluding employer's agreement to be bound by the arbitral decision is consideration); Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 734-36 (7th Cir. 2002); Oblix, Inc. v. Winiecki, 374 F.3d 488, 491
(7th Cir. 2004) (finding continued payment of the employee's salary is sufficient consideration); see also William L. Corbett, Resolving Employee Discharge Disputes under the Montana Wrongful Discharge Act (MWDA), Discharge Claims Arising Apart from the MWDA,
and Practice and ProcedureIssues in the Context of a Discharge Case, 66 Mont. L. Rev. 329,
340-41 (2005).
167. Compare Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1175 (holding that an arbitration provision imposing a
one year statute of limitations is unenforceable) with Great W. Mortg. Corp. v. Peacock, 110
F.3d 222, 230-32 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding arbitration agreement imposing a one year statute
of limitations is enforceable).
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Whether the arbitration provision contains a venue provision
for a designated forum unreasonably difficult for the em1 68
ployee.
Whether9 the provision prohibits employment claims as class actions.

7.

8.
9.

445

16

Whether the pre-dispute clause limits the arbitrator's remedial
authority in a7 0manner inconsistent with the authority author1
ized by law.
Whether the arbitration provision prevents the award of attorney fees to a prevailing employee, or authorizes the award 71
of
fees to the employer inconsistent with that provided by law.'
17 2
Whether the arbitrator is competent to decide the case.

168. Domingo v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 70 Fed. Appx. 919, 920 (9th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (holding that arbitration agreement requiring an employee in Hawaii to arbitrate a
claim in California is invalid); Carter, 362 F.3d at 299-300 (enforcing arbitration agreement containing venue selection clause because all the employees lived near the designated
venue); Ciago v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 295 F. Supp. 2d 324, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding
the validity of a venue clause that would require a New York employee to arbitrate in
California is a matter for the arbitrator).
169. Compare Mantor, 335 F.3d at 1107; Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100,
1118 (Cal. 2005) (holding waiver of class actions renders arbitration clause unenforceable)
with Adkins v. Lab. Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir. 2002); Gentry v. Super. Ct., 37
Cal. Rptr. 3d 790, 794 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2006) (holding waiver of class actions does not
render arbitration clause unenforceable); Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive? 42 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 1
(2000).
170. An employer's attempt to restrict employee statutory remedies collides with the
Supreme Court's Gilmer prescription that arbitration of statutory claims is merely a
change of forum not a change of substance. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Alexander v. Anthony Intl., L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 267 (3d Cir. 2003) (striking an arbitration agreement limiting an employee's statutory remedies).
171. ChristiansburgGarment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (holding that a prevailing employer in a Title VII case may only be awarded attorney fees where the employee's lawsuit was "frivolous"). The Court reasoned that allowing the routine award of
attorney fees to prevailing employers would undermine Title VII by deterring employees
from bringing claims. Unresolved is the enforceability of arbitral provisions in which an
employee waives the right to recover attorney fees and arbitral awards that either deny
attorney fees to a prevailing claimant or that award attorney fees to a losing claimant. Id.
at 422. Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1287 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated, 294 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (denying enforcement of arbitration agreement requiring fee-splitting between the parties); George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248
F.3d 577, 584-85 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that an arbitrator's refusal to award attorney fees
to the prevailing party as authorized by state law cannot be vacated or modified for "manifest disregard" of the law); Musnick v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255, 1260-61 (11th Cir.
2003) (enforcing a "loser pays" provision in an arbitration agreement); Manuel v. Honda
R&D Ams., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 987, 994-95 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
172. This factor contains both procedural and substantive issues of unconscionability.
From a procedural perspective, a reasonable expectation of a party entering into an agreement to arbitrate disputes is that the arbitrator will meet some minimum standards of
competence. Often this is obtained by indicating the arbitrator will be chosen through an
arbitration service provider. In this way arbitrator competence is delegated to a neutral
disinterested service provider. Certainly, if the parties name the arbitrator, while it does
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10. Whether a "union-management" pre-dispute arbitration agreement requires the arbitration of statutory or common law employment claims. 173

c.

Consequence of a Finding of Substantive
Unconscionability

If the pre-dispute provision is substantively unconscionable, a
final issue is whether the entire pre-dispute agreement, or only
the unconscionable portion, should be struck. To avoid this situation, the pre-dispute agreement should contain a severability
clause. 17 4 In the absence of a severability clause, when a court
finds a contract provision to be void, illegal, or unconscionable, it
strives to give effect to the intent of the parties by striking the
offending language and enforcing the agreement. 17 5 When the
contracting parties include a severability clause, courts are even
176
more inclined to strike the clause.
not assure competence, absent non-disclosure, bias, or prejudice, the reasonable expectation test is probably met. From a substantive perspective, an arbitration proceeding is not
fair if the arbitrator is not competent to understand the factual or legal issues in dispute, or
not competent to decide the type of procedural rulings that are necessary to assure procedural fairness. If the decision-maker (arbitrator) is not competent to hear and decide the
substantive issues in arbitration, the process is unduly oppressive, unconscionable or
against public policy. An example occurs when the parties agree to arbitration and the
issues to be decided are complicated claims (such as those brought under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, common law or statutory wrongful discharge, gender, age
and disability discrimination, or common law claims of defamation and infliction of emotional distress) and the arbitrator selected by the service provider is a retired high school
teacher-coach with no legal background, no employment law experience and little or no
arbitration experience. While American Arbitration Association arbitrators are far more
qualified, the question is, what if that was your arbitrator? Does such a decision-maker
conform to the legitimate expectations of both parties? Is such a decision-maker capable of
rendering a decision that complies with the minimums of substantive unconscionability,
particularly when it appears that lack of arbitrator knowledge, training, and experience
favors the non-moving party (in the employment context, the employer)?
173. The Court has not clearly resolved this issue, but has stated that such a waiver, to
be effective, must be "clear and unmistakable." Wright v. UniversalMar. Serv. Corp., 525

U.S. 70, 80 (1998).
174. E.g. Zuver v. Airtouch Communs. Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 758 (Wash. 2004) ("In case any

one or more of the provisions of this [agreement] shall be found to be invalid, illegal or
unenforceable in any respect, the validity, legality and enforceability of the remaining provisions contained in this [agreement] will not be affected .... The provisions of this [agreement] regarding trade secrets and confidential information and arbitration shall survive
the termination of your employment.").
175. Id. at 767; Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 788 (Wash. 2004).

176. Zuver, 103 P.3d at 768.
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Waiver of the JudicialForum

In Kloss, a plurality of the Montana Supreme Court also determined that even if a pre-dispute arbitration provision is not
procedurally or substantively unconscionable, it may nevertheless
be struck if it is not clear that the employee waived his right to a
judicial forum. 177 Justice Nelson wrote in his plurality opinion:
A waiver of a fundamental right (jury trial and judicial forum) must
be proved to have been made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently-typically by the party seeking the waiver. For a fundamental right to be effectively waived, the individual must be informed of
the consequences before178
personally consenting. And the waiver will
be narrowly construed.

The plurality ruled that in applying these principles, a court
must consider a totality of overlapping and non-exclusive factors. 1 79 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court requires that courts be
vigilant against compelling arbitration of legal rights unless the
individual who seeks to avoid the pre-dispute arbitration provision clearly has waived her right to the forum provided by law.18 0
This is true even in union-management disputes.' 8 ' The Ninth
177. Koss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 14-17 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., concurring). Justices Trieweiler, Leaphart and Cotter joined Justice Nelson in his concurring
opinion. Id. at 10, 17.
178. Id. at 15 (citations omitted); VanDyke Constr. Co. v. Stillwater Mining Co., 78 P.3d

844, 847 (Mont. 2003) ("[A] waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a
known right, claim or privilege, which may be proved by express declarations or by a course
of acts and conduct which induces the belief that the intent and purpose was waiver.");
Stewart v. Covill & Basham Constr. L.L.C,, 75 P.3d 1276, 1278 (Mont. 2003).
179. Koss, 54 P.3d at 15. The factors are
[wihether there were any actual negotiations over the waiver provision; whether
the clause was included on a take-it-or-leave-it basis as part of a standard-form
contract; whether the waiver clause was conspicuous and explained the consequences of the provision (e.g. waiver of the right to trial by jury and right of access
to the courts); whether there was disparity in the bargaining power of the contracting parties; whether there was a difference in business experience and sophistication of the parties; whether the party charged with the waiver was represented
by counsel at the time the agreement was executed; whether economic, social or
practical duress compelled a party to execute the contract (e.g. when a consumer
needs phone service and the only companies providing that service require execution of an adhesion contract with a binding arbitration clause before service will be
extended); whether the agreement was actually signed or the waiver provision
separately initialed; whether the waiver clause was ambiguous or misleading; and
whether the party with the superior bargaining power lulled the inferior party
into a belief that the waiver would not be enforced.
Id.
180. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998).
181. Id.
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Circuit Court of Appeals and other courts have required that a
18 2
waiver of the judicial forum must be "knowing and voluntary."
Indeed, ADEA18 3 provides that an employer-initiated "separation and release" agreement (whereby employer and employee
agree that the employee voluntarily quits and waives all rights or
claims against the employer arising out of the employment relationship) is invalid unless the employee makes a "knowing and
voluntary" waiver of her ADEA rights.1 8 4 ADEA prescribes specific criteria that must be met to establish such a waiver. 8 5 While
182. PrudentialIns. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994); Adler v. Fred
Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 789 (Wash. 2004) (noting that the Washington state constitution contained a right to a jury trial and consequently a waiver of that right must be "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently" given). The Adler court held that by "knowingly and
voluntarily agreeing to arbitration, a party implicitly waives his right to a jury trial by
agreeing to an alternative forum, arbitration," and the failure of the arbitration clause to
include a jury waiver provision is not critical because, "the loss of the right to a jury trial is
a necessary and fairly obvious consequence of an agreement to arbitrate." However, the
court remanded the issue back to the trial court to determine whether the employee "knowingly and voluntarily" entered the arbitration agreement. Id. The court said that if the
evidence on remand demonstrated that the employer
threatened to fire him if he refused to sign the agreement despite the fact he
raised concerns with its terms or indicated a lack of understanding, then the evidence here would not support ...

[the employer's] claim that ...

[the employee]

knowingly and voluntarily agreed to arbitration, and thus implicitly waived his
right to a jury trial. However, if as [the employer] contends, its representative
explained the document and offered to answer Adler's concerns or questions, Adler's claim fails.
Id. See also Zuver,103 P.3d at 769 (refusing to consider the issue of the constitutional right
to jury trial and access to courts because employee failed to raise these issues before the
trial court); Kloss, 54 P.3d at 11-17 (Nelson, J., concurring) (detailing the Montana Constitutional right to a jury trial and right to access the courts). However, under the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, state law, regardless of how favored and its place of origination (state constitution, state legislature or common law), to the extent it conflicts with
federal law, is preempted. The U.S. Supreme Court has made it quite clear there are some
concerns with pre-dispute arbitration, and that states may invalidate pre-dispute arbitration contracts on the same basis that are applicable to other contracts. If a citizen may
relinquish a constitutional right by a "voluntary, knowing and intelligent" waiver, the Montana Court may not impose a higher standard regarding the waiver of such right in the
context of an arbitration contract. To do so clearly puts the Montana Court at odds with
the U.S. Supreme Court, the principles of federalism of the U.S. Constitution, and more
than a hundred years of state and federal jurisprudence. Drs.Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517
U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
183. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (Supp. 1965-1968).
184. For a good Montana case illustrating general "release and waiver" language, read
Old Elk v. Healthy Mothers, Healthy Babies, Inc., 73 P.3d 795, 796 (Mont. 2003).
185. 29 U.S.C. § 621. ADEA states that for an employee to waive any right or claim
under ADEA the waiver must be "knowing and voluntary" and will not be considered as
such unless "at a minimum":
(1)(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the employer
that is written in a manner calculated to be understood by such individual, or by
the average individual eligible to participate;
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these criteria are codified in the ADEA, they are based on federal
court decisions regarding employee "waiver of legal rights." Consequently, the ADEA standards have become the criteria that employer counsel should consult in drafting not only employee separation and release agreements, but any agreement where an employee waives legal rights, including waiver of a judicial forum.
III.

CONCLUSION

Almost all labor-management collective bargaining agreements contain a pre-dispute arbitration provision. Indeed, arbitration of labor-management disputes is the norm, and generally
only involves the construction and application of the parties' "private" law agreement. In these situations, judicial intervention is
rare.
If, however, the labor-management parties include in their
agreement language requiring the employer to comply with spe(B) the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under this chapter;
(C) the individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the date the
waiver is executed;
(D) the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for consideration in
addition to anything of value to which the individual already is entitled:
(E) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to executing the agreement:
(F)
i) the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which to consider
the agreement; or
(ii) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees, the individual is given a period of at least 45 days within which to consider the agreement;
(G) the agreement provides that for a period of at least 7 days following the execution of such agreement, the individual may revoke the agreement, and the agreement shall not become effective or enforceable until the revocation period has expired;
(H) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees, the employer
(at the commencement of the period specified in subparagraph (F)) informs the
individual in writing in a manner calculated to be understood by the average individual eligible to participate, as to(i) any class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such program, any eligibility factors for such program, and any time limits applicable to such program;
and
(ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for the program,
and the ages of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit
who are not eligible or selected for the program.
(3) In any dispute that may arise over.., the validity of a waiver.., the [employer] shall
have the burden of proving . . . that a waiver was knowing and voluntary ...
" Id. at
§ 626(f)(1), (f)(3).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2007

35

Montana Law Review, Vol. 68 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 9

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 68

cific statutory employee rights, judicial intervention is more
likely. The U.S. Supreme Court, while generally enforcing arbitration as the exclusive remedy of statutory rights claims, is concerned that the process not lessen employees' substantive rights
and that employees clearly waive their right to a judicial tribunal.
Arbitration of non-union-management disputes is of more recent origin. In particular, pre-dispute arbitration provisions,
which require the arbitration of "any and all" disputes, have become prominent only during the last decade. These pre-dispute
arbitration provisions have garnered much judicial attention. If
an employer desires to enter into a pre-dispute arbitration agreement with its employees and potential employees, it may do so if it
follows the above procedural and substantive standards.
If, however, the employer wants to use arbitration to gain
some advantage over the employee, and takes advantage of its increased bargaining power to do so, the courts will find a way to
strike the arbitration agreement. The ball is clearly in the employers' court: if they want pre-dispute arbitration, they must be
willing to "bend over backwards" 18 6 to make it procedurally and
substantively fair. 187

186. Rick Bales & Reagan Burch, The Future of Employment Arbitration in the Nonunion Sector, 45 Lab. L.J. 627, 634 (1994).
187. Bales, supra n. 161, at 197 ("[A]s some unscrupulous employers continue to find
new and inventive ways to tilt the arbitral playing field in their favor, courts should uphold
their responsibility to ensure fair arbitral processes by refusing to enforce lopsided arbitration agreements.").
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